Negligence, Economic Loss and the Ambit of the Duty of Care by Todd, S.
NEGLIGENCE, ECONOMIC LOSS AND THE AMBIT 
OF THE DUTY OF CARE 
Lecturer in Law, University o f  Sheflield. 
Visiting Lecturer in Law, University of Canierbusy. 
Difficulty in determining the true basis in law for allowing recovery of 
"pure" economic loss whioh is not consequential upon any physical damage 
suffered by a plaintiff has preoccupied the courts in a number of recent 
decisions.' If A relies on negligent information or advice given directly to 
him by B the case can simply be tested against the principles first laid 
down in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd2 as appropriate 
to financial loss caused by misstatements. But what if the information is 
given to C and he acts in a way which causes loss to B. Or suppose A by 
his negligent act or omission causes such loss either directly to B or 
through the instrumentality of C. Can Hedley Byrne apply in any of these 
cases? If not, can a test of foresight of harm based on Donoghue v Steven- 
son3 be applied in the face of long standing judicial reluctance to recognise 
that decision as of any direct relevance in the sphere of economic harm? 
While no clear answers to these questions have been given, the common 
features underlying the decisions where they have been in issue are quite 
apparent. What is lacking is any explicit formulation of principle which the 
courts may utilise in any case of economic loss caused by negligence. 
The key to the formulation of such a principle may be found in a 
passage in the judgment of Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London 
Borough Council4 which has already gained a wide currency. His Lordship 
said as follows: 
Through the trilogy of cases in this House, Donoghue v. Stevenson, Hedley 
Byrne & C o  Ltd v .  Heller & Partners Ltd and Dorset Yacht C o  Ltd v. Home 
Ofice  the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of 
care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that 
situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been held 
to exist. Rather, the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has 
to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has 
suffered damage there is sufficient relat~onship of proximity or neighbourhood 
such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part 
may be likely to cause damage to the latter, in which case a prima facie duty of 
care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary 
to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to 
reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of persons to whom it is owed 
or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise. 
The first stage of this enquiry, in which foresight of damage to one's 
"neighbour" in the sense explained by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson, 
'See in particular the judgment of Megarry V. C. in Ross v Cauilters 119791 3 All 
E.R. 580. 
' [I9641 A.C. 465, hereinafter referred to as Hedley Byrne. 
[I9321 A.C. 562. 
119781 A.C. 728. 
' Ibid at 751-752. 
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obviously provides the outer bounldaries of liability. The question raised 
by the second stage recognises that there are many categories of negligence 
cases where the courts have declined to apply a pure foresight test. Particu- 
lar matters of significance may be the status of the plaintiff6 or defendanL7 
the way in which the harm was caused8 and the nature of the harm ~uf fe red .~  
The policy factors lying behind these decisions are legion. In the particular 
case of economic loss, falling within the last-mentioned of these categories, 
it is clear that judicial inhibitions about the scope for recovery are founded 
almost entirely on t~he all pervasive fear of liability "in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class".10 
This fact has been obscured somewhat because many of the "pure" 
economic loss cases have been decided in the context of negligent mis- 
statements. Where economic harm has been caused by words, this in itself 
has been treated as a reason for restricting the range of liability - for 
example because people may be less careful in words than in deeds,'' 
because the immediate cause of the harm will be the plaintiff's own action 
in choosing to rely upon what was said to hirn12 and because, in the nature 
of things, "words are more volatile than deeds, they travel fast and far 
afield, they are used without being expended".13 Thus there may in any 
particular case be good reasons for treating negligent words differently 
from negligent conduct. This conclusion, however, says nothing about the 
fact that the loss suffered may be economic. 
Liability under the Hedley Byrne principle has been limited to occasions 
where there is a "special relationship" between the parties. As will be 
demonstrated, this relationship is based upon the close degree of proximity 
between plaint8 and defendant and in this respect the courts have re- 
quired a relatively specific degree of knowledge on the part of the defenldant 
of the identity of the plaintiff, of the transaction likely to be brought about 
or affected by the words and of the scale of the plaintiff's likely reliance. 
By these means it has been sought to reduce the ambit of liability to a 
determinate person or class suffering a relatively determinate loss. Other 
factors which are part of the same principle have no especial significance 
for the nature of the loss suffered. Thus the heart of the principle may be 
V r i t i s h  Railways v Herrington [1972] A.C. 877 (trespassers); Murphy v Culhane 
[I9771 Q.B. 94 (criminals) ; 
'Nakhla  v McCarthy [I9781 1 N.Z.L.R. 291 (judges); Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell 
& Co.  [I9801 A.C. 198 (barristers); Arenson v Casson, Beckman, Rutley & Co.  
[I9771 A.C. 405 (arbitrators); Smith v Scott [I9731 Ch. 314 (landlords). 
Moch CO. v Rensellaer Water Co .  (N.Y. 1928) 159 N.E. 896 (omissions); Takaro 
Properties Ltd v Rowling [I9781 2 N.Z.L.R. 314 (negligence in the exercise of a 
statutory power); Hedley Byrne & Co.  Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd supra (mis- 
statements). 
Pratt and Goldsmith v Pratt [I9751 V.R.  378 (nervous shock); Spartan Steel and 
Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co.  Ltd [I9731 Q . B .  27 (economic loss). 
" Ultramares Corp.  v Touche, Niven and Co .  ( N . Y .  1931) 174 N.E. 441 per Cardozo 
C .  J.  
" Hedley Byrne & Co.  Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [I9641 A.C. per Lord Reid at 
482-483. 
Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [I9591 1 Q . B .  55 per Salmon J. at 59 
la Hedley Byrne & C o  Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [I9641 A.C. per Lord Pearce at  
534. 
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found in the requirement that it be foreseeable by the defendant that the 
plaintiff would rely upon the information or advice14 and reasonable for 
the plaintiff to do so. It  is axiomatic that the words must foreseeably cause 
the loss while the element of reasonable reliance or trust is simply of causal 
significance. Thus these two factors are obviously essential also in cases 
where negligent words cause physical harm.15 The lack of any duty in the 
case of statements made on social occasions may also be explained by 
reference to these factors. The further requirement imposed by the Privy 
Council in Mutual Life and Citizens Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt16 that the 
defendant should be in t'he business of supplying information or advice or 
let it be known that he claimed to possess the necessary skill to do so" is 
apparently to be explained by the argument that there is an ascertainable 
standard of skill appropriate only for professionals.'* 
Once having isolated the features in the Hedley Byrne principle relevant 
only to the fact that the loss was economic, it then becomes apparent that 
they may also be applied where the economic loss is caused by conduct. 
Slight differences of wording may be necessary depending on the way in 
which the loss is caused but there need be no difference in substance. The 
true basis for recovery of economic loss thus lies neither in a straight- 
forward application of Donoghue v Stevenson or in Hedley Byrne sim- 
pliciter. The former is too wide and the latter as it stands will usually be 
inapplicable to conduct. Rather in any case the two stage enquiry formu- 
lated by Lord Wilberforce may be adopted. The first stage, founded on 
Donoghue v Stevenson, must be met in a Hedley Byrne case as in any 
ot'her. In the second stage, the nature of the loss is a consideration which 
may "reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of persons to whom 
it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise", and the 
same or similar reducing or limiting factors may be employed in any case. 
These factors, based as they are on a relatively specific degree of know- 
ledge of the plaintiff and of the nature and scale of the loss, occur more 
commonly in negligent misstatement cases which typically arise out of prior 
contact between the parties. Yet in the less common case where a negligent 
actor may be fixed with such prior knowledge, a "special" or "proximate" 
relationship may still be constituted. 
"This seems to be implicit in the notion that the plaintiff should assume responsi- 
bility for what he says. 
'"ee e.g. Watson v Buckley, Osborne, Garrett and Co Ltd [I9401 1 All E.R. 174; 
Clay v A. J .  Crump & Sons Ltd [1%4] 1 Q.B. 533; Smith v Auckland Hospital 
Board [I9651 N.Z.L.R. 191 (where Hedley Byrne was specifically called in aid). 
[I9711 A.C. 793. 
"There may be an exception where the defendant has a financial interest in the 
advice he gives. See W .  B. Anderson & Sons Ltd v Rhodes (Liverpool) Ltd [I9671 
2 All E.R. 850; O'Leary v Lamb (1973) 7 S.A.S.R. 159. 
[I9711 A.C. at 802-808. The minority (Lords Reid and Morris) point out that a 
duty to take care is not the same as a duty to conform to a particular standard of 
skill and there is no ground for saying that a specially skilled man must exercise 
care while a less skilled man need not do so. The case has lacked support in 
subsequent English decisions (Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [I9761 Q.B. 801 
per Ormrod L. J. at 827; Howard Marine and Dredging Co Ltd v A. Ogden & 
Sons (Excavations) Ltd [I9781 1 Q.B. 574 per Lord Denning M.R. at 591 and 
Shaw L.J. at 600) and has been evaded to a large extent in New Zealand. See 
Smillie, "Liability for Negligent Misstatements; Continuing Uncertainty" (1976) 
3 O.L.R. 512. 
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The courts have not yet overtly made this link between all the economic 
loss cases,lg but judging by results they are certainly on the way towards 
doing so. The argument will thus be amplified by examining the cases in 
the light of their suggested common features. The identified categories may 
often overlap or shade one into the other. Ultimately they constitute grad- 
ations on a scale of foreseeability of loss becoming less specific until one 
arrives back at Lord Atkin's neighbour test. Precisely where the courts 
will draw the line depends on where it is thought that the spectre of 
indeterminate liability becomes more compelling than the need to com- 
pensate a more or less identified plaintiff who has suffered a more or less 
specific economic loss. 
FORESIGHT OF ECONOMIC LOSS TO AN IDENTIFIABLE P AINTIFF 
To hold a defendant liable for negligence causing economic loss in cir- 
cumstances where he was able to foresee loss to an identifiable plaintiff 
entails no risk of liability to an indeterminate number of persons whereas 
liability in amount will usually be no more open ended than where physical 
harm is suffered. Thus where this feature has been present in the mis- 
statement cases liability has not been denied simply because to recognise 
it would "open the floodgates". Leaving aside for the moment a considera- 
tion of how precise a degree of knowledge may be required, there has in 
fact been direct contact, or at least contact through an agent, in most of 
the reported cases. For example, bankers and persons enquiring as to the 
credit of customers,20 estate agents and prospective purchasers of land,21 
parties to pre-contractual negotiationsz2 and professional persons and their 
clientsz3 have all been held to constitute relationships giving rise to a duty 
of care. Further, even in the absence of any contact there has usually been 
some degree of prior knowledge of who would rely upon the words.24 
Knowledge by the defendant of the plaintiff's identity is inherently less 
likely where the complaint is of negligent conduct rather than words. Some 
form of communication anld conduct in reliance must take place before 
negligent words can cause any loss whereas negligent conduct will norm- 
' sH~wever Stephen J. did briefly advert to the point in his judgment in Caltex Oil 
(Aust.) Pty Ltd v The Dredge 'Willemstad' (1977) 11 A.L.R. 227 at 263. 
'O Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd supra; Woods v Martins Bank 
Ltd supra. 
"Jones v Still [I9651 N.Z.L.R. 1071; Dodds and Dodds v Millman (1964) 45 D.L.R. 
(2d) 472; Barrett v J .  R. West Ltd [I9701 N.Z.L.R. 789; Bango v Holt (1971) 21 
D.L.R. (3d) 66; Richardson v Norris Smith Real Estate Ltd [I9771 1 N.Z.L.R. 
152; cf Presser v Caldwell Estates [I9711 2 N.S.W.L.R. 471. 
'' Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Downs [I9721 2 N.S.W.L.R. 49; Morrison- 
Knudson International Znc. v The Commonwealth (1972) 46 A.L.J.R. 265; Sea- 
land o f  the Pacific Ltd v Ocean Cement Ltd (1973) 33 D.L.R .(3d) 625; Esso 
Petroleum Co  Ltd v Mardon [I9761 Q.B. 801; Richardson v Norris Smith Real 
Estate Ltd supra; Capitol Motors Ltd v Beecham [I9751 1 N.Z.L.R. 577; J .  & J .  C .  
Abrams Ltd v Ancliffe [I9781 2 N.Z.L.R. 420. The last three cases have been super- 
seded in New Zealand by the Contractual Remedies Act 1979, S6. 
23 Elderkin v Merrill Lynch, Royal Securities Ltd (1978) 80 D.L.R. (3d) 313 (stock- 
brokers); Midland Bank Trust Co Lrd v Hett, Stubbs and Kemp [I9781 3 All E.R. 
571 (solicitors) ; Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co [I9801 A.C. 198 (barristers) ; 
Sutclifle v Thackrah [19'74] A.C. 727 (architects). 
I' Post pp.39-41. 
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ally lead to loss without any prior contact with or knowledge of the plaintiff. 
However in the relatively exceptional case where conduct may foreseeably 
harm an identifiable plaintiff then exactly the same principle may be 
applied. Indeed, if the conduct only causes loss because of the plaintiff's 
reliance on it, Hedley Byrne may be applied in the ordinary way. An 
example is Midland Bank Trust C o  Ltd v Hett, Stubbs and KempZ5 where 
solicitors were held liable to a client, G, for their failure to register an 
option held by G to purchase land owned by G's father, and subsequently 
sold by him in order to defeat the unregistered option.2F Oliver J. recognised 
that the damage suffered by G was economic but held that it was nonethe- 
less recoverable by extending the ambit of the Hedley Byrne principle to 
cover a negligent omission.27 The defendants here made no negligent 
representation. It would be artificial in the extreme to regard the loss as 
caused by an implied representation that the option had been registered. 
The defendants' breach of duty took the form of nonfeasance yet Oliver J. 
felt able to conclude that "the instant case is one in which there was clearly 
between the defendants and [GI a relationship of the sort which gave rise 
to a duty of care under the Hedley Byrne prin~iple".~~ Certainly the learned 
judge's path was smoothed by the fact that the plaintiff, in dealing directly 
with the defendants, reasonably relied on the defendants to carry out their 
professional duties with due care and skill. And presumably the same 
principle could likewise be applied if positive conduct-misfeasance-was 
the cause of the harm.29 However once the "reliance" factor is removed 
the Hedley Byrne formula simply as it stands is hardly appropriate. On the 
facts it permitted recovery of a determinate loss by an identified plaintiff 
but it will not normally be applicable to negligent acts or omissions. Yet 
there is no reason why that part of the principle directed towards estab- 
lishing a sufficiently proximate relationship between plaintiff anld defendant 
should not be of general application in determining the extent of liability 
'; [I9781 3 A11 E.R. 571. See also J .  & J .  C .  Abrams Ltd v Ancli#e 119781 2 N.Z.L.R. 
420 where the plaintiff sued for the balance owing for building work done by it 
and the defendant counter-claimed for damages for negligence by the plaintiff in 
failing to warn of changes affecting the reliability of its estimate for the cost of 
the work. Casey J .  treated the failure to warn as a negligent act rather than a 
negligent misrepresentation by silence but here relied on Caltex Oil (Australia) 
Pty Ltd v The Dredge 'Willemstad' infra rather than Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v 
Heller & Partners Ltd supra in holding that the plaintiff was liable for the pure 
economic loss suffered by the defendant in going ahead with the building work. 
The case well illustrates the need for a common principle governing recovery of 
economic loss whether caused by representations or conduct. 
26 In prior proceedings, Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green [I9781 3 All E.R. 555, 
Oliver J. had held that the sale had rendered the option void. His decision on 
this point has been reversed by the Court of Appeal ([I9791 3 All E.R. 28). If 
this decision is right then the solicitors' negligence does not appear to have caused 
any loss. However the Court gave leave to appeal to the House of Lords and at 
the time of writing the appeal had not been heard. 
"The action was brought in both contract and tort. Oliver J. held, after an 
exhaustive review of the authorities, that there was no rule of law which precluded 
a claim in tort for breach of a duty to use reasonable care and skill if there was 
a parallel contractual duty of care. 
[I9781 3 All E.R. at 610. 
2gThe headnote states as much although the point was not specifically adverted to 
by the learned Judge. 
34 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 1 ,  19801 
for negligently inflicted economic loss. It will be seen that the courts in 
Canada, Australia and England have all countenanced developments in 
this direction, although their choice of a formula to achieve the desired 
result has differed and still remains somewhat obscure. 
First to be considered will be the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works30 The appellant 
had chartered a log barge fitted with two cranes. In the busiest part of 
the logging season the appellant discovered dangerous defects in the cranes 
and had to take the barge out of service for repairs. The respondent manu- 
facturers and distributors had become aware of these defects many 
months earlier but had negligently failed to warn the appellant at an earlier 
time when the cranes could have been withdrawn and repaired during tphe 
slack season. The court held unanimously that the aldditional loss incurred 
on account of the loss of use during the busy as opposed to the slack season 
was recoverable in tort even though it was purely financial. Ritchie J., 
delivering a judgment with which all members of the court concurred on 
this point, found there was a breaoh of duty to warn which consituted 
negligence on the part of both respondents and that the economic loss 
solely attributable to the interruption of the appellant's business during 
"coastal operations" was the immediate consequence of that breach.31 
He concluded that he was satisfied that in the present case there was a 
proximity of relationship giving rise to a duty to warn and that damages 
were recoverable as compensation for the "'direct and demonstrably fore- 
seeable result of the breaoh of that Although not specifically re- 
marked in this conclusion, it may be that the key to discovering a sufficiently 
proximate relationship to allow recovery is found in the following passage: 33 
This is not a case of a negligent manufacturer whose defective or dangerous 
goods have caused damage to some unknown member of the general public into 
whose hands they have found their way. These respondents knew that the cranes 
were going to be used by the appellant and the exact use to which they were to 
be put. 
Ritchie J. also stressed this fact of knowledge elsewhere in his judgment3* 
It is thought that this was in fact the essence of the decision-that the 
defendants knew that this plaintiff would suffer tahe loss and also knew how 
it would arise.35 The description of the loss as the "immediate" or "direct" 
consequence of a breach of duty seems an unhelpful formula. It is not 
" (1974) 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530. 
" Ibid at 544. 
" Ibid at 547. 
83 Ibid at 534. 
" Ibid at 536-537, 542. 
s5Stephen and Mason JJ. in Caltex Oil (Ausr) Pty Ltd v The Dredge 'Willemstad' 
(1977) 11 A.L.R. 227 at 263, 274-275 certainly interpreted Rivtow's case in this 
way. Knowledge of the plaintiff's identity has since assumed a central signficance 
in a number of recent Canadian cases. See Hunt v T .  W .  Johnstone Co Ltd (1977) 
69 D.L.R. (3d) 639; Star Village Tavern v Nield (1977) 71 D.L.R. (3d) 439; 
Gypsum Carrier Inc. v The Queen (1978) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 175; Bethlehem Steel 
Corp. v St Lawrence Seaway Authority (1978) 79 D.L.R. (3d) 522; Yumerovski 
v Dani (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 558; Trappa Holdings Ltd v District o f  Surrey 
(1979) 95 D.L.R. (3d) 107. 
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thought that such a test or tests provides a workable solution to the prob- 
lem in hand.36 
A second important case, and one which has already attracted much 
comment, is Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge "Willem~tad".~~ 
Although the facts are well known, they will bear repetition in a somewhat 
simplified form.38 The dredge "Willemstad" was deepening a shipping 
channel in Botany Bay when it damaged an oil pipeline belonging to 
Australian Oil Refining Pty Ltd (AOR) which ran under the bay from an 
oil refinery operated by AOR to an oil terminal operated by Caltex Oil 
(Australia) Pty Ltd (Caltex). The operators of the dredge had been 
aware of the pipeline and caused the damage by their negligent navigation. 
The pipeline was used to deliver refined oil belonging to Caltex from AOR's 
refinery to Caltex's terminal.39 Caltex had to arrange alternative means of 
transporting their oil to their terminal while the pipeline was being repaired 
and sued the dredge for the additional costs incurred by these special 
arrangements. The High Court held unanimously that the claim succeeded. 
The reasons given by each member of the court differ somewhat but the 
fact that the operators of the dredge were aware of the situation of the 
pipeline and that it carried petroleum products between the AOR refinery 
and the Caltex terminal was relied upon in three of the judgments and may, 
indeed, reasonably be regarded as having been fundamental to the decision. 
The point was made quite explicit by Mason J : 40 
It is preferable . . . that the delimitation of the duty of care in relation to 
economic damage through negligent conduct be expressed in terms which are 
related more closely to the principal factor inhibiting the acceptance of a more 
generalized duty of care in relation to economic loss, that is an apprehension 
of an indeterminate liability. A defendant will then be liable for economic dam- 
age due to his negligent conduct when he can reasonably foresee that a specific 
individual, as distinct from a general class of persons, will suffer financial loss 
as a consequence of his conduct. This approach eliminates or diminishes the 
prospect that there will come into existence liability to an indeterminate class of 
persons; it ensures that liability is confined to those individuals whose financial 
loss falls within the area of foreseeability; and it accords with the decision in 
Rivtow. 
Gibbs J. might be thought to be of the same mind as Mason J. His Honour 
took the view that notwithstanding the general rule limiting recovery for 
non-consequential economic loss, khere are exceptional cases in which 
the defendant has knowledge or means of knowledge that the plaintiff 
individually, and not merely as a member of an unascertained class, will be 
likely to suffer economic loss as a consequence of his negligence, and owes 
'J6 The matter is considered in detail post pp.51-53. 
'' (1977) 1 1  A.L.R. 227. See Cane "Recovery in the High Court of Purely Economic 
Loss caused by Negligent Acts" (1977) 13 U.W.A.L. Rev. 243; Partlett "Recovery 
of Economic Loss for Negligence in Australia" (1980) 9 Syd. L.Rev. 121. 
"Only the issues in the case relevant to the present discussion will be considered 
here. 
"Caltex suffered some minimal physical damage in the loss of oil actually in the 
pipeline when it was fractured. No importance was attached to the point because 
that loss of oil did not cause the economic loss which Caltex sought to recover: 
see Stephen J. at 250. 
" (1977) 11 A.L.R. at 274-275. 
36 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 1, 19801 
the plaintiff a duty to take care not to cause him such damage by his 
negligent act. He declined to formulate a principle that would cover all 
cases in which such a duty would be owed but thought it would be material, 
although not in itself sufficient, that some property of the plaintiff was in 
physical proximity to t4he damaged property or that the plaintiff and the 
person whose property was injured were engaged in a common a d ~ e n t u r e . ~ ~  
It may be noted that Gibbs J. does not comment directly on the case 
where conduct causes economic harm but no physical damage to anyone 
occurs. However he clearly does not rule out recovery in such a case. 
Further, it is not clear why the principle requiring knowledge of the plain- 
tiff individually should not stand on its own. His Honour was clearly in- 
fluenced by the "joint venture" c a s e ~ . ~ ~  But it may be objected that econ- 
omic loss may be suffered in the circumstances postulated yet the fact of 
physical proximity between property of plaintiff and defendant or of a 
joint venture and thus the actual i'dentity of the joint venturer may and 
usually will be unknown before the event in question .Thus it may be that 
these circumstances will only be relevant when they can be foreseen by the 
defendant. 
Stephen J. sought to put his judgment on a rather broader basis. He 
identified the need for insistence upon sufficient proximity between tortious 
act and compensable detriment and in the present case found five salient 
features which left him in no doubt that there existed such proximity to 
entitle the plaintiff to recover its reasonably foreseeable economic 10~s .~"  
The first was the defendant's knowledge that the property damaged, a set 
of pipelines, was of a kind inherently likely when damaged to be productive 
of consequential economic loss to those who rely directly upon its use. 
While this factor may suggest that certain loss is foreseeable, it does not 
on its face appear to help in establishing any more proximate a relationship 
It has, of course, been a feature of a number of cases where economic loss 
has been held irrec~verable.~~ Its significance here lies in restricting the 
recoverable damages to loss which arises in a foreseeable way and thus is of 
a foreseeable kind. This, in combination with the second feature, the 
defendant's knowledge or means of knowledge of the plaintiff as a user of 
the pipeline, was said by His Honour to lead to the conclusion that Caltex 
was within the reasonable contemplation of the defendants as a person 
likely to suffer economic loss if the pipelines were cut. Thus the foresight 
required is clearly of that plaintiff and of that kind of loss. Two further 
features, (i) the infliction of damage by the defendant to the property of a 
third party, AOR, as a result of conduct in breach of a duty of care owed 
to that third party, and (ii) the nature of the detriment suffered by the 
plaintiff in losing use of the pipeline, in context appear to be relevant only 
because the defendants could foresee damage to Caltex specifically and the 
form it would take if they caused property damage to the third party and 
SO caused a loss of use of the pipeline. Otherwise it is not clear why 
these features should be of any greater significance than in, for example, 
" Tbid at 245. 
'' Post p.51. 
" (1977) 11 A.L.R. at 261-262. 
Weller & Co v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute [I9661 I Q .B .  569; 
Electrochrome Ltd v Welsh Plastics Ltd [I9681 2 A11 E.R. 205. 
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E2ect~ochrome Ltd v Welsh Plastics Ltd.45 The last identified feature, the 
nature of the damages claimed as reflecting loss of use, not loss of profits 
arising because collateral commercial arrangements may be adversely 
affected, confirms the point that the manner of the loss must be foreseeable. 
His Honour does not, it should be noted, say such loss of profits are not 
recoverable. If they are in fact specifically foreseeable, they may be.46 
The above analysis demonstrates that the defendant's knowledge of the 
plaintiff's use of the pipeline was a factor central to Stephen J.'s reasoning. 
In fact His Honour specifically linked the requirement of special knowledge 
in the Hedley Byrne line of cases with the facts of the case before 
an observation which serves to confirm the immediate significance of that 
knowledge. 
Jacobs J. took a quite different approach and formulated a test based 
upon the physical effect of the defendant's act or omission on the person 
or property of the plaintiff.48 This particular test, which would-provide only 
the narrowest of bases for recovery, may more conveniently be considered 
under a different head. Finally, Murphy J. in a brief judgment cast doubt 
on the avoidance of multiple actions and of the payment of huge damages 
as valid reasons of policy for exempting from liability persons causing 
economic loss in breach of a duty of ~ a r e . 4 ~  His Honour found no reason 
for limiting recovery in the instant case but gave no further explanation for 
his conclusion. The implication appears to be that economic loss should 
stand on the same footing as physical loss. However there is little support 
elsewhere for this point of view. 
The latest word on this topic may be found in the judgment of Megarry 
V. C. in Ross v Caunterss0 where the choice of formula issue was once more 
squarely raised. The circumstances giving rise to the action were singularly 
straightforward. The defendant solicitors negligently failed to warn a testator 
that attestation of the will by a beneficiary's spouse would invalidate a gift 
to the benefi~iary.~~ The plaintiff beneficiary's husband attested the will, 
which fact remained unnoticed until after the death of the testator. As a 
consequence the gifts to the plaintiff were rendered void. The plaintiff 
thereupon sued the solicitors claiming damages in negligence for the loss 
of her inheritance. Megarry V. C. held that the plaintiff's claim should 
succeed but confessed to considerable difficulty in determining on yhat 
basis the duty of care owed to the beneficiary should rest.52 5 . 
" [I9681 2 All E.R. 205. 
46 Post pp.42-43. 
" (1977) 11 A.L.R. at 263. 
"Ibid at 278. 
Ibid at  285-286. 
60 [I9791 3 All E.R. 580. 
Wills Act 1937 s.15 (U.K.). 
"In the United States, liability in this type of case is well established in ,California 
(Biakanja v Irving 320 P. 2d 16 (1958); Lucas v Hamm 364 P. 2d 685 (1961); 
Heyer v Flaig 74 Cal Rptr 225 (1960); Bucquet v Livingston App. 129 Cal Rptr 
514 (1976) but not, apparently, in New York (Maneri v Amodeo 238 N.Y.S. 
2d 302 (Sup Ct 1963). In Sutherland v Public Trustee 1980 CL (NZ) para 113, a 
recent New Zealand case, the deceased made a will leaving his whole estate to his 
wife with no gift over. The wife predeceased the testator who died intestate. The 
plaintiffs: stepchildren of the deceased, alleged negligence by the Public Trustee 
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The learned Vice Chancellor referred to the reasoning of Aikens J. in 
Whittinghm v Crease & Co53 in the British Columbia Supreme Court as 
one means of reaching the right result. Here a solicitor had drawn up a 
will under which the plaintiff was the residuary beneficiary. The plaintiff 
and his wife were present when the testator executed the will and the 
solicitor pressed the wife to sign it as a witness, which she accordingly did. 
When it was discovered that this invalidated the gift to the plaintiff, he sued 
the solicitor's firm for negligence. Aikens J. held the solicitor was liable. 
He said that the solicitor had made an implied representation that the will 
would be effective and that the plaintiff had passively relied on this. 
Although the judge conceded that he had not been able to find a case in 
which the Hedley Byrne principle had been applied where the plaintiff 
had not acted on the representation, the plaintiff should nonetheless suc- 
ceed, firstly because it was unnecessary for him to act on the representation 
in order to attract the loss which he suffered and secondly because the 
defenldant could reasonably foresee that his own neglect in itself would 
cause the loss, without the plaintiff doing anything at 
Adoption of the Hedley Byrne principle in such circumstances was a 
somewhat artificial method of achieving the desired result. Recognition that 
the solicitor's neglect in itself would cause the loss makes any reliance by 
the plaintiff causally irrelevant. This approach was in any event inapplicable 
in Ross v Caunters where there was no direct contact between plaintiff and 
defendant and where in no sense did the plaint8 rely upon anything the 
defendant did or did not do. Megarry V.C. therefore preferred to reach a 
similar result but by a somewhat different route. After an exhaustive review 
of the authorities he came to rely heavily on t,he decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp," observing 
that despite the factual differences between that case and the one before 
him, the two were closely similar in principle. Sharp's case will be examined 
in detail below. Of more immediate interest is Megarry V.C.'s reasoning. 
He specifically drew attention to the problems of indeterminate liability 
which are bound to occur by the application at large of Donoghue v 
Stevenson to cases of purely financial loss. While cases of negligent mis- 
statements already have the restrictive Hedley Byrne test, for other cases the 
question was, therefore, what modification or form of application of the 
Donoghue v Stevenson basis shouljd be applied in order to meet these 
problems. The learned Vice Chancellor recognised that a number of tests 
iri taking instructions from the testator, in failing adequately to inform the testator 
of the effect of leaving his estate to his wife in toto with no gift over and alleging 
but for the negligence of the Public Trustee they would have succeeded to the 
testator's estate. Jeffries J. held that the defendants had not in fact been negligent 
in advising the testator on the drawing up of the will and in any event, although 
there were indicators to suggest the testator wished to benefit the plaintiffs, that 
was not what his will said, notwithstanding he was given an opportunity to say so. 
To hold there was a duty of care to persons the testator deliberately refused to 
nominate himself would take the law very far beyond its present limits. The 
defendants did not take the point that the loss was purely financial and Jeffries J. 
therefore made no pronouncement on that issue. 
'"1979) 88 D.L.R. (3d) 353. 
Ibid at 373. 
" [I9701 2 Q.B. 223. 
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had been laid down56 but felt it was unnecessary to explore this matter 
further: 57 
Whichever test is applied, the facts of the present case seem to me to satisfy it. 
I can see no reason for excluding liability. There is clearly a high degree of 
proximity between the negligence and the loss. Plainly the defendants not only 
actually knew of the plaintiff individually (without any 'or ought to have known') 
but also knew that the negligence would be likely to cause her financial loss. 
Indeed, I find it difficult to envisage any test based on Donoghue v Stevenson 
that would be stringent enough to exclude the plaintiff. In my judgment both on 
authority and on principle the plaintiff ought to recover her financial loss. I am 
content, indeed happy, to leave it to other courts in other cases on other facts to 
evolve the test or tests that have to be applied . . . I shall indulge in no feats 
of prophecy beyond saying whatever is evolved will be wide enough to allow 
the plaintiff in the present case to succeed. 
Notwithstanding Megarry V.C.'s expressed readiness to leave the evolution 
of an appropriate test to other courts, it is thought that he has in fact 
put his finger on the nub of the matter in this passage. From the preceding 
survey of cases, the importance of the defendant's prior knowledge of, or 
foresight of, the plaintiff's identity as a central feature limiting the range 
of the duty in any case of negligently caused financial loss is perfectly clear. 
That being so, it is necessary to turn to the question of how precise a 
degree of such knowledge will suffice to give rise to the duty. An authorita- 
tive starting point may be found in the judgment of Barwick C.J. in the 
Australian High Court in Mutual Life and Citizens Assurance Co Ltd v 
Evattj8 where he said:59 
The information or advice will be sought or accepted by a person on his own 
beFalf or on behalf of another identified or identifiable person or on behalf of an 
identified or identifiable class of persons. The person giving the information or 
advice must do so willingly and knowingly in the sense that he is aware of the 
circumstances which create the relevant relationship. He must give the inform- 
ation or advice to some identified or identifiable person in the given circumstances 
of the implications of which he is, or ought to be, aware. 
Thus if A gives information to B knowing that B has requested it on behalf 
of, and will pass it on to, C or to a particular class of persons that includes 
C and that C will rely upon it, A may be held to owe a duty of care to C. 
In this type of case B may be regarded as acting as agent for C.60 However 
where A gives information to B and knows C may subsequently rely upon 
it even though it was not received on C's behalf, A may likewise be held 
liable. Dimond Manufacturing Co Ltd v Hamiltons1 and Toromont Zndus- 
trial Holdings Ltd v T h ~ r n e ~ ~  were both cases where the defendant auditors 
prepared company accounts for client companies which to the knowledge 
of the defendants were subsequently shown to the plaintiffs, in Dimond's 
" Specific reference was made to the Caltex Oil case. 
" [I9791 3 All E.R. at 597-598. 
'"1968) 122 C.L.R. 556. 
i' Ibid at 570. 
' O  As in Hedley Byrne itself. 
" [I9691 N.Z.L.R. 609. 
" (1975) 62 D.L.R. (3d) 225. 
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case by one of the  accountant^,^^ who relied upon their accuracy and in 
each case it was held that the requisite "special relationship" was created 
as between plaintiff and defendant.64 This principle has been extended 
further where accountants prepared financial statements for client com- 
panies in circumstances where they should have foreseen that a third party 
would rely upon them but did not actually know of that reliance. In this 
class of case the courts have still stopped short of applying a test simply 
of foreseeable reliance but have limited liability to where the accounts 
have been prepared for the guidance of a specific class of persons in a 
specific class of tran~actions.~~ 
In Haig v BamfordBB the defendant firm of chartered accountants knew 
that the accounts they were asked to prepare were required by the company 
to show to poteptial investors in order to attract an infusion of capital. In 
fact the statements were said to be "required primarily for those third 
parties and only incidentally for use by the C~mpany".~' They were in fact 
shown to Haig who subsequently purchased shares in the Company. The 
Supreme Court of Canada held that in these circumstances a duty of care 
was owed by the defendants to Haig. It was specifically decided that a test 
requiring actual knowledge of the particular plaintiff who will rely on the 
statement was too narrow and that it was sufficient that a defendant should 
have actual knowledge of the limited class that will use and rely on the 
statement. Haig was a member of that limited class to whom the inform- 
ation was intended to be shown for a specified purpose. The court left open 
the question whether the test of foreseeability alone was a proper test to 
apply in determining the duty owed by accountants to third parties.68 
A similar result was reached in the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Scott Group Ltd v M ~ F a r l a n e . ~ ~  Here company accounts prepared by the 
respondents for the company were relied on by the appellants in formu- 
lating a take-over bid. Richmond P. articulated the test to apply as whether 
the maker of the statement was or ought to have been aware that his advice 
or information would in fact be made available to and relied on by a 
particular person or class of persons for the purposes of a particular trans- 
action or type of transacti~n.'~ On the facts His Honour thought that the 
general possibility of a takeover bid being made by someone at some time 
or other was a reasonably foreseeable possibility. Mere foreseeability of 
this kind was not, however, sufficient to give rise to a "special relationship". 
Cooke J. did not formulate any general proposition seeking to define the 
ambit of the class of persons to whom a duty may be owed. His Honour's 
judgment nonetheless contemplates a close and direct relationship based 
la North P. and Turner J. both relied on this factor as giving rise to the duty. 
"Both actions failed for lack of proof of any loss flowing from the defendants' 
breaches of duty. 
6 5 L ~ r d  Denning M.R. in Candler's case left open the question whether there might 
be liability in such a case. 
'"1977) 72 D.L.R. (3d) 68. 
" Ibid at 78-79. 
" Ibid at 75. 
69[1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553. See Johnston (1978) 8 N.Z.U.L.R. 175. 
'" Ibid at 566. 
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upon the respondent's knowledge or foresight of the use to which the 
accounts would be put, a view quite consistent with that of Richmond P. 
However His Honour took a different view of the facts in concluding that 
the evidence disclosed "a plain risk of a takeover and the virtual certainty 
that in such an event the accounts would be relied on by an ~ f f e r o r . ~ ~  The 
third member of the court, Woodhouse J., thought that the accountants 
owed a duty "to those persons whom they can reasonably foresee will need 
to use and rely upon [the accounts] when dealing with the company or its 
members in significant matters affecting the company assets and bu~iness".'~ 
The apparent width of this duty may be tempered by its relationship to 
the particular facts in issue, although it should be noted that His Honour 
expressed himself unimpressed by the fear of indeterminate liability as an 
excuse from liability for negligent c~nduc t . ' ~  
In tlhe result two members of the court contemplated liability to a 
limited class of persons based upon knowledge or foresight of the use 
to which the accounts were to be put while the third put the test in terms 
of mere foreseeable reliance. The former approach provides a means for 
limiting the range of liability to a determinate body of persons although it 
is of necessity imprecise. As for the latter, and notwithstanding Woodhouse 
J.'s confidence in keeping the floodgates shut, it is not bhought that the 
courts are ready or willing to talk in terms of foreseeability alone. It  is 
true that Lord Salmon in Anns' case thought that accountants would be 
liable in damages to any persons who invested in a company in reliance 
upon negligently prepared certified accounts74 but the matter was not in 
issue in that case. Other cases which appear to apply the foreseeability test 
without any limiting features75 may in fact be explained on other grounds.'" 
There is no case where indeterminate economic loss has been recovered 
by the application of such a test. 
The above "class" cases all concern liability for negligent statements 
but there is no reason why a similar principle should not equally apply 
where the complaint is of negligent conduct. In all such cases the court 
would have to determine how widely or otherwise the class of persons 
foreseeably likely to suffer loss should be defined. The larger or more 
amorphous it becomes the wider the range of potential plaintiffs and the 
more the test will approximate that laid down in Donoghue v Stevenson. 
It is thought likely that the courts will continue to require a close relation- 
ship between the parties in the sense of a relatively specific degree of 
foresight by the defendant of harm being caused to the plaintiff. One 
"conduct" case which might have been thought to have qualified under 
suoh a test is Gypsum Carrier Znc v The Q ~ e e n . ' ~  The defendant ship 
negligently collided with and damaged a railway bridge owned by the 
federal Crown. The plaintiffs, three railway companies, were the only users 
" Ibid a t  582. 
" Ibid at 575. 
73 Ibid at 571-572. 
l4 [I9781 A.C. at 769. 
l 3  e.g. Ministry of Housing and Local Goverrznzent v Sharp [I9701 2 Q.B. 213; Gordoiz 
v Moen [I9711 N.Z.L.R. 526. 
'' Post pp.43-48. 
" (1977) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 175. 
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of the bridge pursuant to contractual agreements with the federal Crown. 
The plaintiffs sued for expenses incurred in rerouting their trains while 
repairs were being made to the bridge. Collier J. dismissed the actions, 
holding that economic loss, even if foreseeable, should not be recoverable 
unless it resulted directly from a negligent act. The railway companies were 
not persons so closely and directly affected that those persons having 
charge of the vessel ought reasonably to have had them in contemplation 
when the vessel was proceeding towards the bri~dge and, therefore, no duty 
was owed to them. The test here is obviously based on Donoghue v Steven- 
son. Yet the conclusion reached is surely assertion rather than explanation. 
One would have thought that the users of the bridge were eminently fore- 
seeable on the part of the defendants. Should not the rationale of the case 
lie in the fact that the defendants could not have foreseen who those users 
might be? Indeed, the case is fundamentally similar to Caltex Oil and differs 
only in that the defendants had no actual knowledge of the plaintiffs' 
identities. One might think that a wider test could be applied here and that 
the users of a railway bridge - railway companies - could have been 
regarded as an inherently limited class of plaintiffs who would foreseeably 
suffer loss. Extensions of the Caltex Oil principle in this direction and in 
line with cases such as Haig v Barnford and Scott Group Ltd v McFarlane 
might now reasonably be expected. 
FORESIGHT OF HOW ECONOMIC ~ S S  MAY BE INCURRED 
A requirement that a {defendant should be able to foresee who he may 
injure financially in order to render him liable for the loss certainly pro- 
vides an adequate safeguard against liability to an indeterminate class but 
it may not always in itself suffice to banish the fear of liability in an indeter- 
minate amount. There is some authority to the effect that an individually 
foreseeable plaintiff may recover his financial loss only where a relatively 
specific degree of knowledge or foresight on the part of the defendant of 
how the plaintiff would suffer the loss may be established. Knowledge of 
the transaction to be affected by the information or advice, and thus of how 
the loss may arise, has been said to be relevant in a number of misstatement 
cases, originally by Lord Denning M.R. in Candler v Crane, Christmas 
and Co78 and most recently by Shaw, L.J. in Howard Marine and Dredging 
Co Ltd v A. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd.79 Although there do not 
appear to be any existing cases in which a foreseeable plaintiff has failed 
in his action because the transaction in question was not foreseeable, this 
is nonetheless conceivable if information is used for quite unforeseeable 
purposes. Similarly it has already been seen that in each of the three major 
cases considered above the defendant knew the form which the loss would 
take. Ritohie J. in Rivtow Marine laid emphasis on the defendants' know- 
ledge of the exact use to which the cranes were going to be put.80 Stephen 
'' 119511 2 K.B. 164 at 183. 
'' [I9781 1 Q.B. 574 at 601. 
"In Trappa Holdings Ltd v District of Surrey (1979) 95 D.L.R. (3d) 107 (British 
Columbia Supreme Court) the defendants by their roadworks negligently 
obstructed access to the plaintiff's business. Ruttan J. held the defendants liable. 
They were aware of the plaintiff's situation and its dependence on a ready access 
to its premises. The plaintiff's economic loss resulted directly from the actions of 
the defendants and it was or should have been anticipated that just such a loss 
would occur in that situation. 
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J. in Caltex Oil stressed that the defendants knew that damage to the pipe- 
line was likely to result in economic loss and also that the plaintiffs would 
suffer the particular kind of economic loss the subject of their claim, i.e. 
expenses incurred in arranging alternative means of transporting the oil." 
Finally, while Megarry V.C. in Ross v Caunters did not specifically advert 
to the point, on the facts $he defendants knew precisely how the plaintiff's 
loss would arise. 
This requirement would tend to exclude claims for "relational" losses 
where a particular plaintiff is unable to fulfil business commitments with 
third parties because of the defendant's negligence. For example, Rivtow 
Marine might be unable to deliver logs to its customers while its crane was 
being repaired or Caltex prevented from delivering supplies of oil to cus- 
tomers while setting up alternative means of transporting the oil to its 
refinery. Indeed in the latter case Stephen J. expressly distinguished such a 
claim from that which was before the court. Presumably, however, it could 
succeed if the probability of interruption in third party contracts were 
specifically known or contemplated by the defendant, although this, no 
doubt, would be a rare case.82 There is no reason in principle why such 
"secondary" losses should not be recoverable in appropriate circumstances. 
FORESIGHT OF THE SCALE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ECONOMIC LOSS 
The contention that a rule for cases where there is a prospect of indeter- 
minate liability s4hould necessarily govern cases where there is none is not 
convincing. The point may provide an explanation for a number of cases 
where a defendant has been held liable in circumstances where he could 
not foresee who the plaintiff might be but could foresee the scale of the loss. 
The starting point for a consideration of this category of case is Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government v Sharp,s3 a case which has been 
described as uniqueg4 but the principle of which has nonetheless been 
followed in a number of subsequent decisions. One of the issues requiring 
determination by the Court of Appeal was the claim by the plaintiff Ministry 
against the local authority whose clerk had negligently failed to mention 
in the certificate given in response to a local land charge search made by 
an intending purchaser that the Ministry had a charge on the land in ques- 
tion. Tche purchaser had thus taken the land free from the charge and the 
Ministry sued the local authority for the value of the charge that had been 
lost. 
The above facts, as with those in Ross v Caunters, clearly did not fit in 
the Hedley Byrne mould. In neither case did the plaintiff rely on anything 
said or done by the defendant. It was noted above that Megarry V.C. relied 
heavily on Sharp's case in reaching his decision in Ross v Caunteus. Yet 
what principle underlies Sharp's case itself? Lord Denning M.R. thought 
that the case fell squarely within his dissenting judgment in Candler v 
"The significance of the point was at least implicit in the judgments of Gibbs and 
Mason JJ. 
"See Brazier "Economic Loss-An Australian Solution" [I9781 N.L.J. 327 where 
a link is drawn between the approach adopted by the High Court in Caltex Oil 
and the principles of remoteness of damage in contract. 
" [I9701 2 Q.B. 223. See Mesher (1971) 34 M.L.R. 317. 
Winfield and Jolowicz, Tort (11th ed 1979) p. 272. 
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Crane, Christmas and Co," subsequently approved by the House of Lords 
in Hedley B y r e .  However in Candler's case Lord Denning thought the 
scope of the duty of care owed by accountants engaged to audit a company 
was limited to their employer or client and to any third person to w4hom 
they themselves show the accounts or to whom they know their employer 
is going to show them so as to induce him to invest money or take some 
other action on them.86 In Sharp's case there was no element of induce- 
ment or reliance, which would appear to render Hedley Byrne inapplicable, 
and the plaintiff himself, unlike in Chandler's case and Ross' case, was not 
individually foreseeable. In truth the test for liability laid down by His 
Lordship appears to rest on foreseeability alone: 
I have no doubt that the clerk was liable. He was under a duty at common law 
to use due care. That was a duty which he owed to any person-incumbrancer or 
purchaser-whom he knew, or ought to have known, might be injured if he made 
a mistake. 
Salmon L.J. approached the matter differently. He thought that the 
proximity between the parties was at least as close as that which existed 
between appellant and respondent in Donoghue v Stevenson. The fact that 
the loss was financial no longer mattered on the authority of Hedley Byrne 
v Heller.88 Cross L.J. apparently took a similar view, though with some 
 reservation^.^^ 
It has been observed that in determining the availability of recovery 
for economic loss caused by conduct one cannot use the ordinary reason- 
able foresight test and then pick from the misstatement cases the idea that 
economic loss is recoverable; the issue of breadth of duty and type of loss 
are inextricably linked.g0 How else, then, may the decision be justified? 
One possible answer is to regard the case simply as a variant on the 
principle giving a cause of action to an individually foreseeable plaintiff. 
While the defendants here did not know the plaintiff's identity they could 
hardly be seen to rely upon the point because this was, of course, due to 
their own negligence in omitting the plaintiff's charge from the certificate. 
In any event no member of the court made use of any such reasoning. Lord 
Denning M.R. and Salmon L.J. did, however, make specific reference to 
the fact that the only person who could suffer any loss was the ohargee or 
incumbrancer whose registered charge was carelessly omitted from the 
certificate. There was no risk of an indeterminate liability here. The 
significance of this fact has since become more readily apparent in the light 
of a number of later decisions. 
The next case in time where a similar issue was raised is the well known 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District 
" '19511 2 K.B. 164. 
Ihid at 180-181. 
"[1970] 2 Q.B. at 268. 
" Ibid at 278. Megarry V. C. in Ross v Caunters "with great respect and consider- 
able hesitation" said that he preferred this approach (supra at 596). 
Ibid at 290-291. 
"Craig "Negligent Misstatements, Negligent Acts and Economic Loss" (1976) 92 
L.Q R .  213 at 223. The point was made with reference to Dutton v Bognor Regis 
Urban District Council [I9721 1 Q . B .  373, discussed post. 
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C o u n ~ i l . ~ ~  Lord Denning M.R. and Stamp L.J. both thought that Mrs 
Dutton could recover damages from the defendant council for her loss in 
having purchased a house built on defective foundations which had been 
negligently inspected and passed as fit by the defendants, even though her 
loss was purely financial.92 The reasoning adopted was similar to that of 
Salmon L.J. in Sharp's case, i.e. the duty of care was derived from 
Donoghue v Stevenson and Hedley Byrne permitted recovery for economic 
loss.Q8 Again, no overt attempt was made to delimit the ambit of the duty. 
In no sense was the plaintiff here individually known or foreseen. Rather, 
the defendants could have foreseen loss to that person who happened to 
be the owner when the defects manifested themselves in cracks in the fabric 
of the building. As in Sharp's case ,the scale of the loss was inherently 
limited. The value of Dutton for a discussion of the principles governing 
recovery of economic loss is, however, undermined by the decision of the 
House of Lords in Anns v Merton London Borough Council94 where it was 
held that this type of loss was to be regarded as physical rather than 
economic.Q5 The matter will be considered further below. 
A third English case often ignored for its relevance in the present context 
is Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twi tch ing~ .~~  Lord Denning M.R. in the 
Court of Appeal took the view, obiter, that a finance company was under 
a duty of care to motor dealers to furnish details of hire purchase trans- 
actions to a third party, H.P. Informations Ltd, on which the dealers relied 
to let them know if a car the subject of a contemplated purchase belonged 
to a finance company. A breach of that duty might result in economic 
loss to a dealer who purchased a car which was already let on hire purchase 
in )having to pay damages for conversion to the owner but this was one of 
those cases where economic loss was rec~verable.~~ His Lordship did not 
state why but simply referred to Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & 
Partners Ltd and Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co Ltd. On 
appeal to the House of Lords the majorityg8 decided, inter alia, that in the 
circumstances there was no legal duty on the finance company to register 
or take reasonable care in registering with H.P.I. the particular hire pur- 
chase agreement.99 It was not necessary to decide whether an action for 
'' [I9721 1 Q.B. 373. 
"Ibid a t  396, 414-415. Lord Denning M.R. took the view that the loss was recover- 
able whether categorised as physical or  economic. 
"The other member of the court, Sachs L. J., formulated a principle of liability 
applicable only to public bodies exercising statutory functions. 
B4 119781 A.C. 728. 
"'Lord Wilberforce held (ibid a t  760) that Dtrlton was in the result correctly 
decided but that the correct legal basis for the decision was as determined by their 
Lordships in Anns' case itself. 
" [I9761 Q.B. 225 (CA) ; [I9771 AC 890 (HL). 
'' [I9761 QB at 239. 
Lord Edmund Davies, Lord Fraser and Lord Russell. 
'"The reason was that companies who were members of HPI  were under no obli- 
gation to make use of the facilities provided by HPI  and a dealer who bought a 
car after receiving a negative report from HPI  was to be regarded as taking a 
reasonable business risk. Thus the dealer could not plead that the finance company 
was estopped by negligence from suing him in conversion. 
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damages by the dealer for his economic loss would succeed. Of the minority, 
Lord Salmon clearly thought that it would and that the duty of care was 
well within the principle laid down by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson 
as enlarged by Hedley Byrne and C o  Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd.' Lord 
Wilberforce simply said this was something for another occasion.' 
The point which deserves emphasis is that while in the above circum- 
stances a plaintiff dealer may fail to establish a duty of care, this is not 
because his loss is economic. Thus the views of Lord Denning M.R. in the 
Court of Appeal and Lord Salmon in the House of Lords remain relevant 
and of interest. 
The New Zealand courts have also had to deal with a number of claims 
of a fundamentalIy similar character and sometimes they have found it 
possible to rely expressly on Hedley Byrne even though the plaintiff was 
not individually foreseeable. One clear example is Gordon v Moem3 The 
defendant in this case issued an "open" report certifying the sea-worthiness 
of a motor launch, the "Waiana". This was in response to a request from 
the owner who told the defendant he wished to raise finance on the security 
of the launch. In the event the owner sold the boat to the plaintiffs and 
before doing so showed them the defendant's report. The launch was in 
fact riddled with dry rot and on discovering this the plaintiffs sued the 
defendant for the cost of repairs. Roper J. thought that the special relation- 
ship class within the meaning of the Hedley Byrne principle "extended to 
all who might reasonably be contemplated as having an interest in the 
Waiana's value, whether as lenders or purchasers and to whom know- 
ledge of the contents of the report might reasonably come".4 Notwith- 
standing criticism of the class to whom the duty was held to be owed as 
"erroneously defined with Athinian breadth"5 it is submitted that the case 
was rightly decided. Although any person in the class might suffer the loss, 
only one person could actually do so. The scale of reliance was thus clearly 
fore~eeable.~ Exactly the same may be said of another New Zealand 
decision, Bmrett v Dalgety New Zealand Ltd7 where Bain J .  held, applying 
Hedley Byrne, that land valuers owed a duty of care to any person who 
would advance mortgage moneys in reliance upon the recommandation in 
the valuers' report. 
A further New Zealand decision of considerable interest, even though 
the reasoning of Cooke J,  undoubtedly needs clarification, is Rutherford v 
Attorney-Generala In this case the appellant agreed to purchase a heavy 
' [I9771 AC at 908. It has been noted that his Lordship adopted the same approach 
in Sharp's case, supra. 
'Ibid at 906. 
' [I9711 N.Z.L.R. 526. 
'Ibid at 531. 
Glass J. "Duty to Avoid Economic Loss" (1977) 51 A.L.J. 372 at 380 n 1. 
Elsewhere the decisions are not, however, uniform. In Beebe v Robb (1978) 81 
D.L.R. (3d) 349, where the facts were virtually identical with those in Gordon 
v Moen, Ruttan J. refused to hold the marine surveyor liable. His duty under the 
Hedley Byrne principle was owed only to those persons he new or should 
reasonably know would rely on his opinion. 
[I9791 N.Z. Recent Law 199. 
119761 1 N.Z.L.R. 403. 
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motor lorry from the owner if the lorry could get a certificate of fitness 
issued by the Ministry of Tran~por t .~  After a preliminary rejection on the 
ground of minor defects a certificate was obtained and the purchase was 
subsequently completed. A week later the appellant discovered that the 
vehicle was in an unsafe condition and required considerable work before 
a fresh certificate would be issued. The appellant sued the respondent 
ministry for the cost of that work. As the defects in question were danger- 
ous the case could have been decided on the basis that the loss claimed 
represented the cost of preventing physical harm to the plaintiff or his 
property and for t'hat reason should be regarded as physical.1° Cooke J. 
did not take this approach. He proceeded on the basis that the loss was 
economic but held it nonetheless was recoverable. The certificate was, of 
course, issued to the prior owner, not the appellant, and, indeed, there was 
no evidence that the vehicle inspector knew of the proposed sale. The 
learned judge found it difficult to suppose that the ministry's liability should 
depend on whether the inspector had such knowledge." He thought the 
fact the loss claimed was economic was relevant and in some circumstances 
told against the plaintiff but was far from decisive per se.12 The duty here 
arose because it should have been readily foreseeable by the vehicle 
inspector not only that the truck might be about to be sold but also that 
in the event of an immediate sale the purchaser might rely on the certifi- 
cate.13 
The plaintiff in Rutherford's case was thus able to recover simply 
because he had suffered foreseeable loss. Cooke J. gave no specific guid- 
ance as to the circumstances in which pecuniary loss may be recoverable 
beyond saying that where it is suffered, it "weighs somewhat against the 
claim". Yet at the same time the learned judge stressed the determinate 
nature of the damages sought: l4 
The plaintiff is claiming no more than the cost of the work insisted on by the 
ministry, after a reasonably careful inspection, in order to qualify for a certificate. 
No loss o f  profits or arty other compensation is claimed. [Emphasis added.] 
At this stage of circumstances giving rise to the duty of care may be 
defined and at the same time the features common to all these cases 
identified. By foresight of the scale of the loss, under which heading the 
cases have been grouped, is meant foresight of a loss which is both 
inherently limited to a fixed sum, and thus does not encompass conse- 
quential loss, and is also in the nature of things liable to be suffered by 
only one person. It  may typically arise from foresight of the making by 
the plaintiff of disadvantageous agreements or transactions or of the 
deprivation of the plaintiff's existing rights or expectations. It provides 
an alternative although narrower basis for recovery than in those cases 
where the plaintiff is individually foreseeable where the amount of the 
"equired by Transport Act 1962, s.143 (N.Z.). 
'" Post p.48. 
'I [I9761 1 N.Z.L.R. at  412. 
"Ibid at 411. 
'' Ibid at 413. 
l4 Idem. 
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recoverable loss is not so circumscribed. As the identified limiting features 
are common to the cases, and appear to provide the reason for allowing 
recovery of the loss, it would be sensible to identify them as the circum- 
stances giving rise to the duty and thus in terms define the scope of the 
duty as extending only to foreseeable determinate loss in the above sense. 
A convenient formula is at hand, as already observed. A limitation on the 
scale of recovery may, in the words of Lord Wilberforce, serve "to reduce 
or limit the scope of the duty . . . or the damages to which a breach of it 
may give rise". It provides an accurate rationale for the recovery of such 
loss which is singularly lacking in the explanations given in most of the 
cases themselves. 
What are the implications of this conclusion in the particular field of 
liability for defective products? The traditional view is that loss caused by 
a dangerous product is recoverable in tort on ordinary principles whereas 
loss caused by acquiring a product which does not work is not.l"he latter 
loss is purely financial.16 Nevertheless, inroads have recently been made 
into this principle by classifying the relevant harm in some circumstances 
as physical .This is where expenses are incurred in taking preventive action 
before a latent defect causes further harm. In Bowen v Paramount Builders 
(Hamilton) Ltd17 the New Zealand Court of Appeal helmd that where a 
builder erects a house with a latent defect which causes actual damage to 
the structure of the house itself that loss was physical rather than econ- 
omic.ls Further, the owner could remedy the defect and sue for the cost 
rather than wait until the damage actually occurred.lg This decision was 
approved by the House of Lords in Anns' case where Lord Wilberforce 
opined that the damage to the house caused by defective foundations was 
material, physical damage and what was recoverable was the amount of 
expenditure necessary to restore the dwelling to a condition in which it was 
no longer a danger to the health or safety of persons occupying and 
possibly expenses arising from necessary displa~ement.~~ That the principle 
in Anns also covers preventive action is made clear in the later decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Batty v Metropolitan Property Realisations LtdZ1 
where a house owner sued a builder and a property developer for 
negligently building his house on an unstable block of land which within 
the next ten years would subside into a nearby valley. The plaintiff 
apparently recovered the replacement value of the house, this presumably 
''See Smillie "Liability of Builders, Manufacturers and Vendors for Negligence" 
(1978) 8 N.Z.U.L.R. 109 at 114-124 and Cane "Physical Loss, Economic Loss 
and Products Liability" (1979) 95 L.Q.R. 117. 
"The point has occasionally been overlooked. See The Diamantis Pateras [I9661 
1 Lloyds Rep 179; Algoma Truck & Tractor Sales Ltd v Bert's Auto Supply Lrd 
(1968) 68 D.L.R. (2d) 363. 
" [I9773 1 N.Z.L.R. 394. 
'"ee also Mount Albert Borough Council v Johnson [I9791 2 N.Z.L.R. 234; Young 
v Tomlinson [I9791 2 N.Z.L.R. 441. Where a defect in a motor vehicle causes an 
accident that damages the vehicle that damage is likewise physical: see Fuller v 
Ford Motor Co o f  Canada Ltd (1979) 94 D.L.R. (3d) 127. 
'' [I9771 1 N.Z.L.R. at 410, 417, 423; Young v Tomlinson supra. 
'919781 A.C. at 759. 
'' [I9781 Q.B. 554. 
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on the basis that he could then move out and buy another house and thus 
avert the danger. However the emphasis put in Anns on the risk to the 
occupiers is, perhaps, misleading. It is not thought that Lord Wilberforce 
was intending to cast doubt on the proposition accepted in Bowen that 
preventive repairs entailed by a risk posed to the property itself also fall 
into the category of physical loss. Nor, it might be added, did Lord 
Wilberforce contemplate any distinction in this context between defective 
houses and defective chattels.22 
Given the classification of the relevant loss as physical, the court in 
Bowen's case was able to hold that the claim for damages for loss in value 
of the building after all possible remedial work had been done and for 
loss of rent arising from the structural defects were su~tainable.~~ This was 
thus simply economic loss consequential on physical damage. Two mern- 
bers of the court nonetheless gave consideration to the problem of non- 
dangerous defects. Richmond P. doubted whether liability would extend 
SO far: 24 
As at present advised I do not think that the courts would be justified in imposing 
a duty of care on builders tantamount to the full warranties normally implied in 
a building contract. Any such extension of the present law seems to me to be 
more properly a matter for legislation. 
On the other hand Cooke J. gave specific support to the proposition that 
economic loss alone may also be recoverable: 2 5  
In view of the origin of contractual liability in the old action on the case in tort 
any tendency to exclude tort because the field is already covered by contract 
would, perhaps, be ironical. In principle, and in the light of the opinions of the 
Master of the Rolls and Sachs L. J. in Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District 
Council, I do not see why the law of tort should necessarily stop short of recog- 
nizing a duty not to put out carelessly a defective thing, nor any reason compelling 
the courts to withold relief in tort from a plaintiff misled by the appearance of 
the thing into paying too much for it. 
The third member of the court, Woodhouse J., did not deal with this point. 
There is much to be said in support of Cooke J.'s opinion. The distinction 
between physical and economic loss may be purely incidental. Take a 
builder who negligently erects a house where in breach of a local bye-law 
the building line is too near an adjoining street. The local authority serves 
an enforcement notice requiring the matter to be rectified. This entails 
demolishing the house and starting afresh. There is no risk of harm to 
persons or property in such a case. But should a different conclusion be 
reached for that reason alone? 
If the nature of the loss is not a reason for denying recovery in tort for 
non-dangerous defects in houses and chattels, are there any other reasons 
which are more compelling? The majority view in Rivtow Marine was 
that liability for the cost of repairing damage to a defective article and for 
"See the dissent of Laskin J. in Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works 
supra at 548, said to be 'of strong persuasive force' by Lord Wilberforce in Anns, 
supra at  760. 
23 [I9771 1 N.Z.L.R. at 41 1. 
"Ibid at 413-414. 
"Ibid at 423. 
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economic loss flowing directly from the negligence is akin to liability 
under the terms of an express or implied warranty of fitness and as it is 
contractual in origin cannot be enforced against the manufacturer by a 
stranger to the contract.26 With respect, is this not fundamentally the same 
argument that prevailed in Winterbottom v Wright2? in the context of 
physical harm and which was decisively overturned in Donoghue v Steven- 
son? The fact that work may be done by A pursuant to contractual 
obligations owed to B does not mean that the same work cannot give rise 
to tortious obligations owed to C .  Recent decisions imposing concurrent 
duties in contract and tort confirm the argument." In Ross v Caunters 
Megarry V.C. had no difficulty in holding that a solicitor owed a duty in 
tort to a third party in addition to his concurrent duty in contract owed to 
his client. Thus it is not thought that there is any special difficulty with 
respect to the imposition of the duty. Problems may ,however, be 
envisaged in determining the standard of care required of the manufacturer. 
Products may be manufactured to varying standards of quality or fitness 
under a contract between A and B. How, then, can any duty owed by A 
to C, the ultimate consumer who has no knowledge of that contract, be 
measured? The answer lies in determining objectively whether the particular 
product was reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which it might be 
sold or used.29 A manufacturer who originally took all due care by gving 
notice of a defect or labelling a product as of inferior quality or as a 
"second" could not then be said to be in breach of any duty nor to have 
caused any loss if it were later resold to a purchaser without any warning 
or label.30 
An associated problem is where the manufacturer in the original contract 
of sale excludes his liability for defects in the product. In Young & Marten 
Ltd v MeManus Childs Ltd31 Lord Pearce said there seemed to be no 
reason why a third party should have better rights than the original pur- 
c h a s e ~ . ~ ~  On the other hand, if the manufacturer should foresee damage 
to that third party, who usually would have no knowledge of the provi- 
sions of the contract, then what is the relevance of that contract? A manu- 
facturer might exclude liability for dangerous defects33 yet this clearly 
would not affect the position of an injured third party. Once it is recognised 
(1973) 40 D.L.R. (3d) at 541. 
(1842) 10 M & W 109. Lord Abinger foresaw that 'the most absurd and out- 
rageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue' if it should ever 
be held that a party to a contract was under a duty to anyone but the promisee. 
Batty v Metropolitan Property Realisations Ltd supra; Midland Bank Trust Co 
Ltd v Hett, Stubbs and Kemp supra. The New Zealand courts have, however, 
taken a different approach: MacLaren Maycroft & Co v Fletcher Development 
Co Ltd [I9731 2 N.Z.L.R. 100; J .  W. Harris & Son Lid v Demolition & Roading 
Contractors ( N . Z . )  Ltd [I9791 2 N.Z.L.R. 166. 
28 See Smillie op cit at 11 8. 
'O Could an action lie against a vendor for breach of a duty to warm of a non- 
dangerous effect? See Smillie op cit at 131-135. 
'' 119691 1 A.C. 454. 
Ibid at 469. 
"Such an exlusion is ineffective in the U.K. See Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, 
ss.2; 16. 
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that the fact work is done under a contract does not prevent a duty in tort 
from arising out of that work then the situation contemplated by Lord 
Pearce is bound to occur. It might be thought unfortunate but it is certainly 
no reason for denying the existence of that duty. 
However compelling the arguments on the inter-relation of tort and 
contract, it is thought that it is no longer sufficient to deny liability for 
loss in acquiring a safe but defective product simply because that loss is 
economic. The liability of the manufacturer would be for a foreseeable 
determinate sum-in principle the difference between what the purchaser 
has paid and the value of what he has got.34 NO doubt a manufacturer 
might be faced with multiple claims in the case of mass produced products 
but the number would nonetheless be determinate, the maximum being 
represented by the number of articles produced. Multiple liability can and 
does occur in the case of dangerous products and that has never been seen 
as a reason for denying liability. Nor should it in the case of shoddy 
products. 
The assumption made in the preceding discussion is that economic loss 
consequential on loss of use of a safe but defective product woulld remain 
irrecoverable in tort. If this is right it would certainly lead to anomalies. 
It has been seen that the cost of preventive repairs to a dangerous product 
is regarded as physical harm, thus permitting recovery of economic loss 
caused by loss of use of the yet exactly the same loss could be 
suffered while a safe defect is being repaired. However the authorities, 
although somewhat meagre, are against liability. It has already been 
observed that in Rutherford's case Cooke J .  drew a clear distinction 
between 'damages for the cost of repairs to the lorry and damages for loss 
of use. Chilwell J. drew a similar distinction in Hope v Manukau City,3E 
another New Zealand decision. Should the point arise directly in a case 
where the identity of the plaintiff could not be foreseen, it seems likely 
that the distinction will be maintained. It is only because the scale of the 
loss can specifically be foreseen that recovery may be permitted at all. 
"IMMEDIATE" ECONOMIC LOSS 
In a celebrated example in Morrison Steamship Company Ltd v The 
Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners)37 Lord Roche took the case of a defend- 
ant who negligently damaged a lorry carrying the plaintiff's goods, causing 
them to be unloaded and carried forward in another vehicle. His Lordship 
thought that the cost of unloading and carriage could be recovered because 
the owner of the goods and the owner of the lorry could be treated as being 
engaged on a "joint venture".38 It  has been pointed out that while the 
concept of a joint venture was here being used for a very special and 
limited purpose, we are left completely in the dark as to what may be held 
" In  practice the damages would usually be the cost of repair or the original sum 
experided if the defect were irrepairable. 
" Bowen v Paramount Builders (Hamilton) Lta supra. 
[I9761 2 N.Z. Recent Law (NS) 324. 
[I9471 A.C. 265. 
" Ibid at 280. 
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to constitute a joint venture for this purpose, except for the given example.39 
Lord Denning has since explained the grounds for recovery as lying in the 
"immediacy" of the damage40 but again it is quite uncertain when damage 
may be regarded as "immediate" or, a term sometimes used interchange- 
ably, "direct". Although references to immediate or direct damage may be 
found sprinkled throughout the cases41 nowhere are these terms defined. 
Nor do there appear to be any decisions founded solely on the fact that the 
damage suffered was of this kind save, perhaps, for Taupo Borough 
Council v Birnie42 a recent decision of t~he New Zealand Court of Appeal. 
It was held here that the respondent hotel could recover loss of accommo- 
dation profits caused by a fall in business after extensive publicity had been 
given to flooding of the hotel when the streams on which it was situated 
overilowed, this having been caused by the negligence of the defendants in 
carrying out work upstream from the hotel. This decision may be justified 
on well established principles. The respondents certainly suffered physical 
damage to the hotel buildings and the subsequent fall in occupancy was 
caused by and consequential on that damage and the fear that it might 
happen again. Cooke J. makes the point explicit in his approval of the 
trial judge's finding that the flooding would not only make some of the 
bedrooms unavailable for a time but would also deter travellers and travel 
agents from making bookings, because of doubt about whether satisfactory 
accommodation would be available or misgivings about further flooding.43 
That finding in itself should allow recovery. The difficulty comes with 
Cooke J.'s preceding words that in his view the economic losses caused 
by the floods "were not the less immediate or direct because they were 
pr~longed" .~~ This was a similar conclusion to that reached by Richmond 
P. who held that the loss "was such an immediate consequence of that 
negligence to be legally rec~verable".~~ Unfortunately there is no further 
guidance on what particular factors made t'his loss so "immediate" or 
"direct". What is more 'immediate" about it than, for example, the loss 
suffered by the plaintiffs in Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co 
Ltd in being unable to use its furnaces to make the four melts the antici- 
pated profits on which were disallowed by the Court of Appeal? The 
Spartan Steel case itself makes it clear that English law recognises no prin- 
ciple of parasitic damages under which a head of damage not otherwise 
recoverable could be annexed to some other claim for damages which was.46 
'Atiyah "Negligence and Economic Loss" (1967) 83 L.Q.R. 248 at 255-256 where 
it is pointed out that there is authority in the form of two decisions of Devlin J.  
(Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [I9571 2 Q.B. 1; Burgess v Florence Night- 
ingale Hospital for Gentlewomen [I9551 1 Q.B. 349) that a person is not entitled 
to recover for pecuniary loss caused by physical injury to his partner although 
partnership is the best and most obvious illustration of a joint venture in law. 
4V.C.M.  (United Kingdom) Ltd v W .  J .  Whittall and Son Ltd [I9711 1 Q.B. 337 at 
345-346. 
" See, for example, Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works supra. 
" [I9781 2 N.Z.L.R. 397. 
'3 Ibid at 404. 
" Idem. 
" Ibid at 402. 
"[1973] Q.B. 27 per Lord Denning M.R. at 35; cf Seaway Hotels Ltd v Cragg 
(Canado) Ltd (1959) 21 D.L.R. (2d) 264. 
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T~hus the fact that the respondents in Taupo Borough Council v Birnie 
suffered physical harm could not make their further loss any more 
'immediate". 
In general terms the idea of immediacy seems to be founded on an un- 
expressed notion of causal proximity rather than on any particular 
application of the foresight test. In theory it provides another means of 
limiting the range of liability for financial loss but is too vague to be help- 
ful. Taupo Borough Council v Birnie is best explained as a case taking a 
wide view of what amounts to consequential economic loss. 
A further test for recovery which might be regarded as contemplating 
the recovery of "immediate" loss but which stands on its own is found in 
the reasoning of Jacobs J. in the Caltex Oil case. His Honour formulated 
a test based on physical propinquity between persons or property and the 
place where the conduct of the defendant had its physical effect such that 
a physical effect on the person or property of the plaintiff is foreseeable as 
the result of the defendant's act or omission.47 In one respect this approach 
is broader than that formulated by Jacob J.'s brethren. Nowhere does His 
Honour appear to require foresight of the actual fact of physical propin- 
quity. This would seem to be quite fortuitous. Rather the test is whether, 
given this fact, a phyical effect on the plaintiff's person or property is 
foreseeable. In other respects it is far narrower. The facts of no other 
case discussed so far in which financial loss has been held to be recoverable 
would fall within its ambit. No doubt Jacobs J. would disclaim any 
intention to lay down a test applicable to the different circumstances of 
different categories of cases. But why formulate a principle with such 
obvious lack of utility? It seems to lead only up a blind alley. Further, 
the reasoning itself may be criticised for failing to give any adequate 
guidance on what is meant by "physical propinquity" and "physical 
effect" or to explain what relationship these new concepts bear to the well 
established concepts of physical and economic For these reasons 
it is thought with respect that Jacobs J. has marked out a path likely to be 
trodden only rarely. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt as to the existence of a judicial fear of indeterminate 
liability for economic loss. The purpose of this article has been to 
recognize this fact rather than to consider whether it is justified 
and to identify those tests evolved by the courts which require specific 
types and degrees of foresight to be established and which thus reduce the 
scope of potential liability. They may here be expressed in terms of the 
two-stage enquiry formulated by Lord Wilberforce in Anns' case. Thus 
where a claim is for economic loss not consequential on physical harm the 
court must ask firstly whether the loss is foreseeable. If it is the court must 
then ask certain further questions. Should the defendant have foreseen 
damage to this particular plaintiff or to a limited class of persons including 
the plaintiff? If so, should he have foreseen the particular way in which it 
arose? Alternatively, should the defendant have foreseen the scale of the 
loss, as defined? If either the first two or the third question is answered in 
"(1977) 1 1  A.L.R. at 228. 
"Cane (1977) 1 3  U.W.A.L. Rev. at 254-257. 
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the affirmative the nature of t'he loss does not preclude recovery49 although 
other factors still may.50 How stringently these tests will be applied and 
whether the law will evolve further towards a simple Donoghue v Stevenson 
test of foresight of damage to one's neighbour remains to be seen. Experi- 
ence may gradually come to show that the judicial fears are exaggerated. 
The cases decided within the last ten years in themselves constitute a 
dramatic advance in what was a rigidly controlled field of liability. One 
largely unremarked consequence of this expansion51 is that negligence 
liability may increasingly take over the field covered by existing torts 
dealing with the recovery of economic loss, usually, although not neces- 
sarily, as a result of intentional conduct. Defamation is an obvious ex- 
ample. The tort may, of course, be committed unintentionally and without 
negligence but most defamation cases concern intentionally disparaging 
remarks directed at particular persons. Where financial damage results 
there may be scope for a duty of care in such cases. Similarly the require- 
ment of "malice" in injurious falsehood52 may now have been overtaken 
by negligence. More controversially, at least some aspects of passing off 
may fall within the ambit of negligence, in particular inverse passing off53 
and unauthorised use of another's name and sponsorship value." Finally, 
are there implications here for conspiracy, intimidation and interference 
with contract? An intention to cause damage is regarded as essential in 
these torts. I t  seems most unlikely that the courts would wish to render 
actionable combinations or threats which harm the plaintiff or conduct 
which induces breach of the plaintiff's contract with another simply 
on proof of neg l igen~e~~  but whether there is any stronger reason for deny- 
ing a duty of care beyond a simple assertion that the duty has never been 
recognised in such cases is doubtful. The relationship between negligence 
and these other torts is a difficult issue and is clearly one which sooner or 
later the courts will have to tackle. 
If they are all answered affirmatively, as in Ross v Caunters, there is every reason 
to allow recovery. 
See n 6 - 9, ante p.30. 
"Though see Mesher (1971) 34 M.L.R. 317 at 321-323. 
52 Balden v Shorter [I9331 Ch. 427. 
63 Bullivant v Wright (1897) 13 T.L.R. 201. 
S4 Henderson v Radio Corporation Pty Ltd (1960) S.R. (N.S.W.) 567. 
"An attempt to plead a negligent inducement of breach of contract failed in 
Mchren  v British Columbia Institute of Technology (1979) 94 D.L.R. (3d) 411. 
